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Threat Actors and Motivations
• Cybercriminals
– Costs to global economy $450B+ annually
• Cyberactivists/Hacktivists
– Motivated by philosophy, politics, and 
non-monetary goals
• Cyberspies
– Financial, industrial, political, and 
diplomatic espionage
• Cyberterrorists
– Political, religious, ideological, or social 
violence
• Cyberwarriors
– Attack by a nation-state in order to 
advance strategic goals
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...And You Only Have Limited Control
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Aviation Cyberattacks
Compromise at "Major Airport"
• McAfee Labs reported that hackers were selling 
remote access to a "major airport" for $10 on the 
Dark Web (07/2018)
– Underground forums contain IP addresses for remote 
desktop protocol (RDP) access to hundreds of 
compromised systems
– At least one "major" international airport is amongst 
the compromised networks
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Air Traffic Control
• Dozens of aircraft vanish from ATC
in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany,
and Slovakia, twice over a 6-day
period (6/2014)
– Ostensibly due to nearby military e-warfare exercise...
• Cyberattack launched by Russian APT group APT28 (aka 
Pawn Storm) jammed Sweden's air traffic control 
capabilities, grounding hundreds of flights over a 5-day 
period (11/2015)
– Outage initially said to be due to solar flares
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Aircraft Vulnerability (2)
• DHS reports Boeing 757 vulnerable to
hacking (11/2017)
– DHS team performed a remote,
non-cooperative penetration (09/2016)
• No one touched anything on the plane. No
insider threat. Used equipment that would
pass through security.
• Were able to establish a presence on the aircraft network
– Boeing claims to have witnessed the test and states "that 
there was no hack of the airplane’s flight control systems."
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Aircraft Vulnerability (3)
• Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), a Dept. 
of Energy research lab, concluded that the hack of an 
airplane is only a "matter of time" (01/2018)
• Estimated cost of $1M to change a line of avionics 
code and years to implement the change
– Patching avionics code is code prohibitive
– 90% of commercial aircraft are "legacy" systems – i.e., 
designed in 1970s and '80s -- not built with security in 
mind
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Aircraft Communications Addressing 
and Reporting System (ACARS)
• Flight plan information sent to planes can be "forged"
– Some experts claim that this is not a safety issue but merely one of 
confusion because pilots will catch an error
– Some of these problems exacerbated because different planes have 
different display formats (although
they all use the same datalink protocol)
• Hacks into ACARS are suspected in
grounding of 10 LOT airplanes at
Warsaw Chopin Airport (6/2015)
and all United planes in U.S. (5/2015)
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ADS-B
• Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
– Aircraft obtain position information from GPS
– Aircraft simultaneously
broadcast position and
other data to aircraft
and any ground station
equipped to receive
– Ground stations
transmit aircraft
position information 
to ATC
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Threats to ADS-B System
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L. Purton, H. Abbass, & S. Alam.  2010.  Australasian Transport Research Forum 2010 Proceedings 29 September – 1 October 2010, Canberra, Australia 
Vulnerabilities of Comms Systems
• ACARS and ADS-B can be breached wirelessly
• Both lack security features and encryption
• Open source sites such as flightaware.com and flightradar24.com
display ADS-B
and ACARS data
– After acquiring this data, a hacker
can easily determine what Flight
Management System (FMS) is being
used by the aircraft
– A hacker might then exploit the FMS
to potentially lead to a complete
remote takeover of the aircraft
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GPS Jamming
• Several incidents of GPS jamming occurred at Liberty 
International Airport (EWR) while tests were ongoing for 
new ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) (08/2012)
– 1st Boeing 787 made GBAS Landing System capable landing in 
10/2012
• GPS jammer found to belong to a truck driver who didn't 
want his company to be able to track his location at certain 
times on certain days
– A truck on the NJ Turnpike ran with a GPS jammer between 
03/2009-04/2011 before being caught
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GPS Issues (1)
• Between 2013 and mid-2016, ~80 
reports of GPS signal interference or 
malfunction were reported to NASA
– Reports from small to large aircraft, 
general and commercial flights, and 
countries from France and the U.S. to 
Egypt and Turkey
– Majority of incidents were total signal 
loss or misreporting location
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GPS Issues (2)
• Multiple (unconfirmed) 
incidents reported in eastern 
Mediterranean Sea (03/2018)
– Five ships and one airplane 
reported extended GPS periods 
of GPS interference/disruption
– Resulted in inaccurate or no 
GPS position reported
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And Some New Concerns...
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Here comes the big one …
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Ransomware
• Malware encrypts the files on your computer
– Might also encrypt all network shares
• Ransom paid via anonymous
cryptocurrency
– Small ransom for individuals,
– larger ransom for organizations
– Help desk often available to assist!!
• Most Popular Cybercrime Tool, 2017
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WannaCry/Petya
• WannaCry detected on 12 May 2017
– By 13 May, had infected 10s of thousands of computers in 99 countries 
throughout the Americas, Asia, and Europe
– By 14 May, had impacted more than 200,000 computers in 150 
countries
– Petya followed on 26 June
– Worldwide cost could top $4B
• Airlines and the aviation industry were not specific targets but were 
susceptible (e.g., Windows XP)
– Boryspil International Airport (KBP), Kiev and Boeing were among 
aviation victim sites worldwide
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Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
• A 2018 survey concluded that supply chain vulnerabilities are rampant
– If an attacker cannot break into their primary target's network, they will look 
at other attack vectors
– Aircraft manufacturers and airlines 
are obvious targets and they are 
popular targets for hackers
– The global, highly interconnected 
supply chains within aviation 
have been aggressively digitizing 
operations and security has been 
a secondary focus
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UAV Components
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From Hartmann & Steup (2013), The Vulnerability of UAVs 
to Cyber Attacks - An Approach to the Risk Assessment 
• GPS spoofing
• Control signal interception/spoofing
• Video signal interception
• Sensor interference
• Ground station malware
• DoS attack
• Use as a tool of terrorism
The Danger of Drones
• This was a purposeful 
yet illegal and foolish
episode...
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Terrorism
• Venezuela 
arrests six over 
drone 
explosions 
during Maduro
speech (8/5/18)
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IoT
• The Internet of Things (IoT) -- aka The Internet of Everything (IoE) --
is incredibly difficult to secure
– Low-cost, consumer grade products frequently have minimal user 
interface, default passwords, and fixed passwords
– Target of several large DDoS attacks (e.g., Dyn, 10/2016)
– Not built with security in mind
• Internet growth...
– 1992: Tens of thousands of devices
– 2017: 10B devices
– 2020: 30B+ devices
– 2025: 75B+ devices
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What Now?
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AIAA Framework
• A Framework for Cybersecurity (AIAA, 2013)
1. Establish common cyber standards for aviation systems
2. Establish a cybersecurity culture
3. Understand the threat
4. Understand the risk
5. Communicate the threats and
assure situational awareness
6. Provide incident response
7. Strengthen the defensive system
8. Define design principles
9. Define operational principles
10. Conduct necessary research and development
11. Ensure that government and industry work together
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http://www.aiaa.org/AviationCybersecurity/
Summary
• The aviation network is complex
• The systems are highly intertwingled
• There are a vast number of attack vectors
• You can't control all parts of the network
• You need response, contingency, and business continuity 
plans
• Cybersecurity problems are real
– Corollary: The threat landscape is constantly changing
• Cyberthreats can be mitigated, not solved
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Conclusion
• If left unchecked, cyberattacks are an existential threat to 
the industry
– As more automation is introduced into systems, they become 
more prone to attacks -- the exploits are there just waiting for 
the enabling vulnerabilities to catch up
• "We have to move the discussion on cybersecurity from the 
expert level to the corporate level" (Peter Andres, Lufthansa)
• "Anyone who thinks that technology can solve their 
problem does not understand technology or their 
problem." (A paraphrase by GCK)
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Questions?
